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Abstract
Interpersonal trust is a one-sided social dilemma. Building on the
binary trust game, we ask how trust and trustworthiness can evolve in
a population where partners are matched randomly and agents some-
times act as trustors and sometimes as trustees. Trustors have the
option to costly check a trustee’s last action and to condition their
behavior on the signal they receive. We show that the resulting popu-
lation game admits two components of Nash equilibria. Nevertheless,
the long-run outcome of an evolutionary social learning process mod-
eled by the best response dynamics is unique. Even if unconditional
distrust initially abounds, the trustors’ checking option leads trustees
to build a reputation for trustworthiness by honoring trust. This in-
vites free-riders among the trustors who save the costs of checking and
trust blindly, until it does no longer pay for trustees to behave in a
trustworthy manner. This results in cyclical convergence to a mixed
equilibrium with behavioral heterogeneity where suspicious checking
and blind trusting coexist while unconditional distrust vanishes.
JEL classification: C72; C90
Keywords: Trust Game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Reputation, Best
Response Dynamics
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1 Introduction
1.1 Trust
Trust is a characteristic that throughout the world permeates a vast vari-
ety of human relationships. Friendship and love, family relations, economic
and business relations, are all built to some extent on trust. Arrow (1973,
1974) described trust as an “important lubricant of a social system” with-
out which “no market could function”. Economists have pointed out that
trust is an important part of human capital, through various channels influ-
encing macroeconomic variables like GDP growth, inflation and volume of
trade (La Porta et al. (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), Guiso et al. (2006)).
The causes and consequences of trust have also been intensively studied in
sociology, psychology, and management science.
Here we focus on the question how interpersonal trust can arise in the first
place. An interpersonal trust situation is an interdependent relationship
between a trustor and a trustee that can be well described by a two-person
game. The paradigmatic trust game is the one constructed by Berg et al.
(1995), also called the investment game, but this is an infinite game and
here we focus on a simpler binary version as it was presented in Dasgupta
(1988) and in Kreps (1990).
In a binary trust game, the trustor may or may not place trust. If he does,
the trustee has the options to honor or to abuse trust. Compared to the
status quo of no trust being placed, the trustor benefits from honored trust
but regrets abused trust, while the trustee benefits from honoring trust
but even more so from abusing trust. Formally, this defines an extensive
form game. The trustor starts the game with the options to trust (T) or to
distrust (D). If he distrusts, the game ends. If he trusts, then the trustee can
react by honoring (H) or abusing (A) trust. The trustor’s preferences over
outcomes are given by (T,H)  (D)  (T,A) and the trustee’s preferences
are (T,A)  (T,H)  (D). The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
requires the trustee to abuse any trust placed and therefore the trustor to
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distrust. However, this equilibrium is strictly Pareto dominated by the trust-
honor outcome. Hence, individual rationality is incompatible with social
optimality; the trust game represents a social dilemma. Note, however, that
as opposed to the prisoners dilemma the trust dilemma is only one-sided. If
the trustee could credibly commit to choosing H, the trustor would happily
place trust.
1.2 Trustworthiness
If placing trust is not part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, then why
do we observe so much trust? A simple answer is that many trustees appear
to be trustworthy, i.e. they honor trust. This does not only correspond to ev-
eryday experience but has been observed in literally hundreds of laboratory
experiments (Johnson and Mislin (2011)). Given a positive probability of a
stranger to behave in a trustworthy manner, the trustor’s optimal decision
depends on the stakes and on his risk preferences only and may well be to
place trust. But this just raises the more puzzling question of why trustees
should be trustworthy at all.
Intuitively, in the absence of explicit incentives like contractually agreed
rewards or punishment, being trustworthy may nevertheless pay off if (i)
encounters between trustors and trustees are repeated, and if (ii) there is
a chance that a trustee’s trustworthiness becomes known among trustors.
In this case honoring trust may serve as a means to gain a reputation of
being trustworthy. If trustors condition their behavior on trustees’ repu-
tations, establishing a reputation for trustworthiness may turn out to be
advantageous.1
1Indeed, trustors have a habit of checking the past behavior of their trustees. Trust, but
verify! is a catchphrase Ronald Reagan famously used, derived from a Russian proverb
frequently cited by Vladimir Lenin. The German Trau, schau, wem! with the same
meaning goes back to the Latin Fide, sed cui, vide! Apparently, forming one’s beliefs
about a trustee’s expected behavior by examining his past trustworthiness has stood the
test of time.
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1.3 Evolution of trust and trustworthiness
The traditional economic approach to model reputation effects in repeated
strategic interactions is via the theory of repeated games. Kreps (1990) is
an early example where the trust game has been subjected to an analysis in
this flavor; for a more recent one see Xie and Lee (2012). While the repeated
games approach to reputation has accumulated an impressive amount of lit-
erature (Mailath and Samuelson (2006)), it is inherently static and therefore
unable to explain why or how different modes of behavior may arise from
given initial settings. Moreover, the Folk Theorem typically destroys the
hopes of arriving at a unique prediction for equilibrium behavior.
During the last two decades, the evolution-and-learning approach to mod-
eling changes in behaviors within populations of interacting individuals has
gained more ground. Pioneered in biology by Maynard Smith (1982), evolu-
tionary game theory later gained popularity in economics as well (Samuel-
son (1997), Weibull (1997), Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998), Gintis (2000), Cressman (2003), Sandholm (2010)). The
evolutionary approach typically posits a population of boundedly rational
players who are repeatedly and randomly matched to interact in a game.
Each player is bound to a strategy for some time, but strategies may be
revised every now and then and this makes the proportions of strategies
in the population evolve, with successful strategies becoming more frequent
over time.
We follow the evolutionary approach here and study a simple model of the
evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a single population under the best
response dynamics, a traditional learning model for rational but myopic
agents. Since agents are randomly matched, trust can only arise if there is
the possibility to obtain information about the trustee’s behavior. Previous
models of this type typically assumed that this information is provided for
free to all or a subset of all trustors.2 However, in many instances such in-
formation is not public and must be actively obtained by trustors, which is
2See the next section for details on these models.
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a costly endeavor. Here we assume that obtaining information on a trustee’s
previous behavior is costly and that the decision whether or not to “pur-
chase” this information (an act we call checking) is a strategic decision of the
trustor. This leads to a relatively simple model where individuals prepare
strategies for both roles they might find themselves in. In the trustee role
these are either honor or abuse, while in the trustor role strategies differ in
whether or not they check and, in the checking case, how to react conditional
on the information they receive. While the full dynamics of the population
state takes place in a large 11-dimensional space, it turns out that it can be
reduced in three simple steps to the analysis of a 2-dimensional dynamical
system which is straightforward to solve.
We show analytically that in the long run we can expect the state of the
population to converge cyclically to an equilibrium state with behavioral het-
erogeneity: Trustworthy and non-trustworthy trustees coexist with trustors
who check their partner’s previous behavior and with “blindly trusting”
trustors who abstain from checking. Unconditional distrust, however, is
bound to disappear in the long run.
1.4 Related literature
We are not the first to study trust and trustworthiness in an evolutionary
setting. The amount of published work is still tiny compared to the (closely
related) literature on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma,
but several rather diverse evolutionary models are scattered throughout the
economic, biological and social sciences literature. An early approach can
be found in a series of papers by Gu¨th and Kliemt (1994, 2000) and Gu¨th
et al. (2000). This work is based on the indirect evolutionary approach which
assumes that behavior is rational but preferences evolve. The focus is on
the conditions under which a trustworthy type (i.e. a type of trustee who
prefers to honor trust even in a one-shot setting) can evolve. For more recent
studies in this spirit see Ahn and Esarey (2008) or Rabanal and Friedman
(2014, 2015).
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In the more traditional (“direct”) evolutionary approach we employ, pref-
erences are fixed, but strategies evolve. Complex models where trusting
need not be a binary choice and various assumptions on the specifics of the
transfer of information from trustees to trustors are employed have been an-
alyzed numerically by Bicchieri et al. (2004), Bravo and Tamburino (2008),
McNamara et al. (2009), Manapat and Rand (2012), and Manapat et al.
(2013). Analytical studies of evolutionary trust models can be found in
De Silva and Sigmund (2009), Courtois and Tazda¨ıt (2012), Masuda and
Nakamura (2012), and Tarnita (2015). These studies differ in various as-
pects from our analysis. While they all show that in the long run mutual
trust and trustworthiness can be established at least to some degree, the
specific mechanisms how and why this happens is sometimes obscured.
Interestingly, the work most closely related to ours turns out to be Andreozzi
(2013). It studies the evolution of trust under best response dynamics in
a population where players are modeled by finite automata. Upon being
matched, two automata play infinitely many rounds of the binary trust game
and receive their discounted payoffs, diminished by the complexity costs of
the automaton they use. Remarkably, while this approach is very different
from ours, it leads to a qualitatively identical dynamical system (apart from
Andreozzi (2013) considering two separate populations for the two player
roles), suggesting an interesting parallel between our conditional strategies
with checking costs and his finite automata with complexity costs.
We propose the present model for the study of the evolution of trust and
trustworthiness mainly for its apparent simplicity. The assumption of costly
checking as a strategic decision seems natural. Without having to rely on
numerical simulations we are able to predict a unique long-run equilibrium
which lends itself to straightforward comparative statics analysis. Moreover,
the underlying dynamical process leading to selection of this equilibrium and
the resulting behavioral heterogeneity is presented in a visually appealing
way which can be understood quite intuitively.
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2 Model
2.1 The binary trust game
We follow Kreps (1990) here and consider the binary trust game (TG) de-
picted in Figure 1. Player 1, the trustor, can either trust (T ) or distrust
(D). Distrust ends the game with payoffs 0 for both players. If the trustor
trusts, player 2, the trustee, can either honor the trust placed in him (H),
resulting in rewards r1 > 0 for the trustor and r2 > 0 for the trustee, or
he can abuse the trust, capturing the benefit b > r2 for himself while the
trustor incurs a loss −c < 0. We assume that r1 + r2 > b− c. The strategic
form of this game is given by the payoff bimatrix
H A
T r1, r2 −c, b
D 0, 0 0, 0
(1)
The efficient outcome is (T,H), but the unique subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium is (D,A). This equilibrium is part of a component of partially mixed
Nash equilibria {(D, q)| 0 ≤ q ≤ cc+r1 } where q, the probability of the trustee
honoring trust, is small enough to render distrust a best response for the
trustor.
The symmetrized binary trust game (STG) starts with nature choosing
which player will be the trustor and which the trustee. This is a symmetric
two-player game with strategies si ∈ Sˆ = {TH, TA,DH,DA}, where the
first and second component of si denotes the action chosen in the role of the
trustor and the trustee, respectively. Up to the factor 1/2, the STG is given
by the payoff matrix
7
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Figure 1: The binary trust game.
TH TA DH DA
TH r1 + r2 r2 − c r1 −c
TA r1 + b b− c r1 −c
DH r2 r2 0 0
DA b b 0 0
(2)
Consider now a large population of infinitely-lived individuals each of which
is bound to play some pure strategy. Time t is continuous and individuals
are repeatedly and randomly matched in pairs to interact in the symmetrized
binary trust game. Since we want to integrate the concept of a reputation
for trustworthiness, we assume that a trustor may opt to obtain informa-
tion on the trustee’s last action in the trustee-role. We call this behavior
checking. We presume that there are many more interactions than revision
opportunities. Hence, checking amounts to revealing to the trustor whether
or not the trustee is trustworthy (plays H in his trustee-role). However, we
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assume that checking is also costly, with checking costs a > 0 deducted from
the trustor’s payoff in each interaction where he chooses to check.
Upon playing the trust game with the checking option (TGC), the trustor
now has to decide whether or not to check. If he does not check, he has to
choose an action T or D. If he checks, he has to choose an action conditional
on the signal H or A he receives. The strategy set of a trustor in the TGC
is therefore S1 = {NT,ND, TT, TD,DT,DD}, where NX is the strategy
of not checking and playing action X ∈ {T,D} while the remaining four
strategies are checking-strategies denoted by the actions chosen conditional
on observing H and A, respectively.
We assume that trustees do not observe whether or not they have been
checked, so the trustee’s strategy set in the TGC remains S2 = {H,A}. In
the symmetrized trust game with the checking option (STGC) the players’
strategy set is now enlarged to
S = {NTH,NDH,TTH, TDH,DTH,DDH, (3)
NTA,NDA, TTA, TDA,DTA,DDA}.
Payoffs in the STGC are pi(XY Z,X ′Y ′Z ′) = 12 [pi1(XY,Z
′) + pi2(X ′Y ′, Z)],
where XY,X ′Y ′ ∈ S1, Z,Z ′ ∈ S2 and the payoff functions pi1 and pi2 are
given by the payoff bimatrix
(pi1, pi2) =
H A
NT r1, r2 −c, b
ND 0, 0 0, 0
TT r1 − a, r2 −c− a, r2
TD r1 − a, r2 −a, 0
DT −a, 0 −c− a, b
DD −a, 0 −a, 0
(4)
We denote by ∆S the 11-dimensional simplex of mixed strategies in the
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STGC and extend the payoff function pi in the ususal way to mixed strategies
x ∈ ∆S .
2.2 Best response dynamics
In our player population strategy XY Z earns an expected per-interaction-
payoff of pi(XY Z, x), where x ∈ ∆S is the population state. We posit now
a basic version of bounded rationality and assume that strategy updating is
guided by the social learning dynamics known as the best-response dynamics
(BR-dynamics), which was introduced by Gilboa and Matsui (1991), Mat-
sui (1992), and Hofbauer (1995). Under the BR-dynamics, each player is
equipped with a Poisson alarm clock. Upon his clock ringing, a player revises
his strategy choice by choosing a myopic pure best response to the current
population state. This results in the population state x(t) moving along
(possibly non-unique) solutions, called best response paths (BR-paths), of
the differential inclusion
x˙(t) ∈ B(x(t))− x(t), (5)
where B(x) is the set of (pure or mixed) best responses to state x. As long
as the current best response is unique, the BR-path describes a straight line
pointing to this current pure best response. If a BR-path converges, the
limit is a Nash equilibrium.
For asymmetric two-population games with population states p and q the
BR-dynamics reads (p˙(t), q˙(t)) ∈ (B1(q(t)), B2(p(t)))−(p(t), q(t)), where B1
and B2 are the respective best response correspondences. For example, in
the TG all BR-paths outside of the equilibrium component converge to the
subgame perfect equilibrium, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: In the TG, all BR-paths outside the equilibrium component con-
verge to (D,A).
3 Analysis
Now we set out to find the long-run behavior of the population state in the
STGC under the BR-dynamics. Though the state space is 11-dimensional,
the task is greatly simplified by the following three observations, which we
will use to sequentially reduce the state space we have to analyze.
3.1 Observation 1
Under BR-dynamics updating players never switch to strictly dominated
strategies, hence such strategies are eliminated quickly. It thus suffices to
study the BR-dynamics in the reduced STGC after eliminating strictly dom-
inated strategies. From the payoff bimatrix (4) it is clear that the trustor’s
strategies TT , DT , DD are strictly dominated. Intuitively, it makes no
sense to pay the checking costs and then not to react optimally to the signal
obtained. It follows that in the STGC the six strategies TTH, DTH, DDH,
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TTA, DTA, DDA are strictly dominated as well. Eliminating those we are
left with the reduced STGC (rSTGC) comprising the remaining six strate-
gies NTH, NDH, TDH, NTA, NDA, TDA. This reduces the dimension
of the state space we are dealing with from eleven to five.
The STGC is only interesting if checking is not prohibitively costly, i.e. if
the trustor’s strategy TD is not dominated by a mixture of NT and ND. A
quick calculation shows that for this we have to assume
a <
r1c
r1 + c
, (6)
which we will do henceforth.
3.2 Observation 2
Consider the projection from S to S1×S2 which separates a strategy XY Z
into the corresponding pair of strategies (XY,Z), and its extension to ∆S .
From Berger (2002), this projection respects the best response structure of
the game, i.e. it maps BR-paths of the rSTGC to BR-paths of the corre-
sponding reduced TGC (rTGC) given by the payoff functions3
(pi1, pi2) =
H A
NT r1, r2 −c, b
ND 0, 0 0, 0
TD r1 − a, r2 −a, 0
(7)
From the long-run behavior of the population state in the rTGC we can
then infer the long-run behavior of the population state in the rSTGC. This
allows us to further reduce the dimension of the state space we are working
in from five to three.
3With a little abuse of notation we stick to denoting those payoff functions by pi1 and
pi2.
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3.3 Observation 3
The rTGC is a two-person game where one of the players has only two pure
strategies. For this class of games Berger (2005) showed that all BR-paths
converge to the set of Nash equilibria. Moreover, a suitable projection allows
one to analyze the global dynamics in these games in two dimensions. The
projection is chosen in such a way that the hyperplane of indifference of the
player with two strategies (the trustee in case of the rTGC) is projected to a
horizontal line. This projection maps the state space ∆3 ×∆2 of the rTGC
and its partition into different best response regions to a rectangle parti-
tioned into different rectangles in the plane. For the rTGC with population
states (p, q) ∈ ∆3 ×∆2 the projection is given by the map
P (p, q) = (q2, pi2(p,H)− pi2(p,A)). (8)
We call P (p, q) the induced population state. As explained in more detail
in Berger (2005), P maps BR-paths in the rTGC to so-called induced paths
in the plane. The behavior of induced paths in the plane is easy to study
and allows one to obtain the behavior of BR-paths in the rTGC and, by
Observation 2, in the rSTGC and therefore in the original STGC.
3.4 Combining the Observations
The combination of the three observations listed above allows us to reduce
the study of BR-paths in the 11-dimensional state space of the STGC to
the study of induced paths in the 2-dimensional plane. Since the projection
maps are linear, piecewise linear BR-paths pointing to pure strategy pairs in
the rTGC are mapped to piecewise linear induced paths pointing to points
on the boundary of the induced state space (the rectangle) in the plane. The
remaining analysis is a simple exercise in planar geometry and the result is
shown in Figure 3.
By construction of P , trustees switch to honoring if the induced population
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P(TD,H) 
B2 = A 
B1 = NT B1 = TD 
B2 = H 
B1 = ND 
P(TD,A) 
P(ND,H) P(ND,A) 
P(NT,A) 
P(NT,H) q2 
P(p*,q*) 
Figure 3: Induced paths (q2(t), pi2(p(t), H)− pi2(p(t), A)) in P (∆3 ×∆2) of
the rTGC. The middle line is the horizontal axis.
state is above the horizontal axis and they switch to abusing if it is below
the horizontal axis. Induced paths therefore move to the left above and to
the right below the horizontal axis.
If q2 is large, i.e. if most trustees abuse, trustors switch to blind distrust
(ND), since neither blind trust nor buying information pays off. In the
rightmost vertical sector, therefore, induced paths point to one of the bound-
ary points of the horizontal axis. This is the case for q2 >
r1−a
r1
. If q2 is in an
intermediary range, ac < q2 <
r1−a
r1
, the checking strategy TD becomes opti-
mal for trustors. In the middle vertical sector induced paths therefore point
to one of the top vertices of the rectangle. Finally, if q2 is small enough,
q2 <
a
c , it does no longer pay to check and trustors turn to trusting blindly
(NT ). In the leftmost vertical sector induced paths therefore point to one
of the bottom vertices of the rectangle.
The rTGC has a mixed Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) at a point on the boundary
face of the state space where blind distrust is unused and where trustors
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are just indifferent between blind trust and checking (both strictly superior
to blind distrust), while trustees are just indifferent between honoring and
abusing trust. This equilibrium can be calculated to be given by
p∗ =
(
r2
b
,
b− r2
b
, 0
)
, (9)
q∗ =
(
c− a
c
,
a
c
)
. (10)
BR-paths in a neighborhood of this equilibrium spiral inwards and con-
verge cyclically to the equilibrium, as is well known from Brown’s (1951)
early analysis of the mathematically equivalent continuous-time fictitious
play process in zero-sum games.4 The induced equilibrium P (p∗, q∗) and
the induced paths spiraling into it can be seen in Figure 3.
Apart from this isolated equilibrium the rTGC also admits a 1-dimensional
component of Nash equilibria where trustors blindly distrust and q2 is large
enough to yield ND the trustors’ best response. Payoffs are zero for all
players in this equilibrium component. The induced component is visible as
the bold line segment on the horizontal axis in Figure 3.
From Figure 3 it is clear that all induced paths outside of the induced equilib-
rium component converge either cyclically to the induced mixed equilibrium
P (p∗, q∗) or straight to the induced equilibrium P (ND,A). The latter’s
basin of attraction is marked as the grey region in the rectangle. For the
rTGC this means that all BR-paths outside the equilibrium component con-
verge either to the equilibrium (p∗, q∗) or to (ND,A). BR-paths starting in
the equilibrium component are non-unique. They may stay in the compo-
nent forever or move to the left end of the component and then exit towards
(TD,H) and finally converge to (p∗, q∗).
Note, however, that while (p∗, q∗) is locally asymptotically stable, the equi-
4Cyclic 2× 2-games are strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, see Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998). Geometric proofs for cyclic convergence can be found in Rosenmu¨ller
(1971), Berger (2002) and Berger (2012).
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librium component is unstable. If an arbitrarily small fraction of trustors
starts to check, honoring suddenly beats abusing and the population state
leaves the component’s neighborhood and converges to (p∗, q∗). While this
is extraneous to the model, it implies that under arbitrarily small noise we
should expect the population to end up at (p∗, q∗) in the long run from any
initial condition.
The final step in our analysis is to move back from the rTGC to the rSTGC.
This can be done as explained in Berger (2002). The equilibrium (p∗, q∗) in
the rTGC corresponds to a continuum of equilibria in the rSTGC. However,
there is only a single equilibrium in this continuum which attracts the BR-
paths in the rSTGC. This is called the Wright equilibrium, since it lies at the
intersection of the equilibrium continuum with the so-called Wright manifold
(see also Cressman (2003) for details on the role of the Wright manifold in
symmetrized games). In this equilibrium the frequency of the rSTGC’s pure
strategy XY Z is given by the product of the frequencies of the respective
rTGC’s pure strategies XY and Z in (p∗, q∗), which can thus be written as
x∗ = (11)
=
r2(c− a)
bc
NTH +
r2a
bc
NTA+
(b− r2)(c− a)
bc
TDH +
(b− r2)a
bc
TDA.
Of course (with a little abuse of notation) this is also the attracting equilib-
rium in the original STGC.
A more illustrative way to write down the trustors’ and the trustees’ long-
run strategies (9) and (10) is perhaps
p∗ =
r2
b
NT +
b− r2
b
TD, q∗ =
c− a
c
H +
a
c
A. (12)
Long-run equilibrium payoffs in the STGC are 12
[
r2 + r1
c−a
c − a
]
> 0 and
the frequency of efficient interactions (blind trust and honor) is r2(c−a)bc .
The social dilemma is therefore partially remedied, depending on parameter
16
values.
4 Discussion
Interestingly, from the equilibrium frequencies in (11) and (12) it can be
seen that r1 has no influence whatsoever on the levels of trust or trustwor-
thiness.5 Intuitively, this is because trustors are rewarded whenever they
meet a trustworthy trustee, independently of whether they check or trust
blindly. Thus they only have to trade off the costs of checking and the costs
of being abused in their indifference condition.
It is also noteworthy that the frequencies show the usual counterintuitive
reaction to payoff changes in mixed equilibria. While one could superfi-
cially expect that the demand for checking goes up if the price a of checking
decreases, this is not the case. The equilibrium frequency of the check-
ing option remains unchanged. Instead, honoring of trust increases among
trustees. The reason, of course, is that in a mixed equilibrium the fre-
quencies of a player’s strategies are determined by indifference of the other
player. Indeed, if a goes to zero, abusing vanishes among trustees, while the
ratio between blind trust and checking remains constant. In Figure 3 the
induced equilibrium component of distrust on the right shrinks to a point
at P (ND,A) while the induced isolated equilibrium moves to the left and
converges to the boundary along the horizontal axis. Note, however, that
there is a discontinuity at the limit a = 0. If we let checking be costless, the
trustor’s checking strategy TD becomes weakly dominant and consequently
the upper left vertex in Figure 3, corresponding to the STGC-strategy TDH,
attracts all interior best response paths. In the limit, all interactions are ef-
ficient.
5Provided r1 is not too low, i.e. as long as inequality (6) is guaranteed.
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